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Accounting for Cross-Country Differences in Employee Involvement 
Practices: Comparative Case Studies in Germany, Brazil and China 
Martin Krzywdzinski 
 
Abstract 
Employee involvement is a contested concept in organizations. While the mainstream of the research 
debate has focused on measuring the strength of employee involvement (EI), this article emphasizes 
the existence of very different forms of EI. It draws on case studies of the German, Brazilian and 
Chinese plants of a German automobile manufacturer to analyse forms of EI and to investigate their 
societal determinants. The article reveals considerable differences in the design of employee 
involvement between the self‐organization model and the competition/social involvement model. It 
shows how industrial relations and cultural factors lead to these very different approaches. 
 
1. Introduction 
Employee involvement is a contested idea: while some authors see it as a core element of HR 
concepts influencing employee motivation and engagement (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Pil and MacDuffie 
1996), others question its impact (cf. Vidal 2007) or criticize it as a managerial technique of work 
intensification (cf. Ramsay et al. 2000). In this article, I suggest that this controversy is in part due to 
the implicitly universalistic assumptions of many studies, which focus on measuring the strength of 
employee involvement (EI) and the outcomes for workers and companies, but neglect differences 
between various forms of EI.  
This article develops a new set of indicators that can be used to distinguish different forms of 
EI. It draws on case studies of the German, Brazilian and Chinese plants of a German automobile 
manufacturer (referred to here as ‘GerCar’) to investigate the factors shaping employee involvement 
practices. Findings show considerable differences in the design of employee involvement in the three 
plants. In the German case, EI practices focus  
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on self‐organization. The Brazilian case is similar to the German case in some respects, but differs in 
that social involvement activities are accorded a much higher importance. The Chinese case 
represents a very different EI model that puts considerable emphasis on social involvement and 
creating work engagement through competitions. These differences are explained by two factors: first, 
industrial relations (in particular institutionalized labour bargaining rights and the organizational power 
of trade unions), and second, organizational culture (in particular sector‐specific organizational 
legacies regarding employee involvement). 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. In Section 3, 
the methods and research field are described. Section 4 is devoted to the case studies in Germany, 
Brazil and China. Section 5 discusses the explanations for the emergence of different models of 
employee involvement, while Section 6 concentrates on general conclusions.  
 
2. Employee involvement: state of the research and hypotheses 
What Is Employee Involvement and How Can It Be Measured? 
Employee involvement (EI) can be understood as encompassing very different practices; sensu stricto, 
it is usually understood as the direct (face‐to‐face) participation of individuals or small employee 
groups in activities and decisions within the company — this is also the understanding in this article. 
We thus distinguish EI from interest representation through trade unions or works councils and high‐
level participation in strategic managerial decisions by employee representatives (Marchington and 
Wilkinson 1992, 2005). Our concept of EI is limited to practices, which are not based on statutory 
rights of employees, but are usually granted (and thus controlled) by management. 
 There are various definitions of employee involvement that do, however, overlap to a 
considerable extent (see Kim et al. 2010; Marchington 2007). Marchington and Wilkinson (2005) 
distinguish between four main dimensions: task‐based participation (understood as multi‐skilling, job 
rotation etc.), self‐management in teams, participation in problem‐solving activities and direct 
communication between workers and management. We find these dimensions of employee 
involvement in all classical texts (e.g. Appelbaum et al. 2000; Pil and MacDuffie 1996) and in many 
empirical studies (see Posthuma et al. 2013).  
Comparative empirical research has mainly focused on measuring the strength of EI with the 
help of additive indexes (e.g. Doellgast et al. 2009; Gallie 2009). The implicit assumption has been 
that there is a universal concept of EI that allows us to add up the various EI practices and classify 
countries according to EI strength. This argument has particularly been advanced in research on high‐
involvement work systems (HIWS) (Boxall and Macky 2014).  
In contrast to the above‐mentioned studies, the dependent variable here is the form of 
employee involvement. I argue that EI is a multi‐dimensional 
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construct and that it is necessary to distinguish between different forms of EI, with each emphasizing 
different dimensions and potentially producing different outcomes. Similar arguments were made in 
the past by Appelbaum and Batt (1994), who identified ‘lean production’ and ‘team production’ models 
in the United States, and by authors comparing Japanese, German and Swedish approaches to work 
organization and involvement (e.g. Jürgens 1994). Edwards and Wright (2001) and more recently 
Gallie (2013) also emphasized the multi‐dimensionality of the concept of EI.  
It is difficult to directly compare EI strength if the form of EI varies. EI practices have to be 
analysed as part of management regimes, in which they reflect the interests and goals of different 
actors and may perform different functions ranging from efficiency goals to strengthening employee 
commitment and retention. EI can support employee empowerment but also strengthen social control 
in the workplace (cf. O'Reilly and Chatman 1996). Employee involvement practices are often powerful 
in shaping behaviour and can be used as a kind of ‘social engineering’ (Thompson and Findlay 1999). 
This danger, however, affects some forms of EI more than others.  
In the following analysis, we distinguish between four dimensions of EI:  
 
1. Self‐organization in teams (including aspects such as multi‐skilling and job rotation, defined as 
‘task‐based participation’ by Marchington and Wilkinson 2005; see also Appelbaum et al. 
2000; Gallie 2013): this dimension emphasizes the decision‐making in the team.  
2. Participation in problem‐solving and improvement (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Cox et al. 2006; Pil 
and MacDuffie 1996): this dimension focuses on giving employees space to develop their 
competences and on mobilizing their knowledge for the company.  
3. Social involvement activities: this dimension has been neglected so far in the EI research and 
emphasizes the participation of employees in organizational life and strengthening their 
belonging to the company; a particular focus lies on the use of competitions (Alferoff and 
Knights 2003; Bolton and Houlihan 2009; Kinnie et al. 2000).  
4. Direct employee–management communication (Cox et al. 2006; Gallie 2009): this dimension 
aims at improving the information of employees regarding organizational processes and 
collecting quick and direct feedback to management.  
 
EI and Industrial Relations 
The existing research has shown cross‐country differences in EI strength, which fits well with the 
arguments of the literature on national employment systems (Marsden 1999) and the transfer of 
employment practices by multinational companies in different institutional settings (Edwards 2004; 
Ferner et al. 2011). Doellgast et al. (2009) and Holman et al. (2009) emphasize the differences in EI 
strength between coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs). They 
refer to the varieties of capitalism 
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approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) to explain the differences, even though not all national institutional 
features prove to be of the same importance. In Doellgast's (2012) analysis, labour bargaining rights 
are decisive for strong EI: high‐involvement systems only develop in contexts with ‘strong workplace 
democracy’ and ‘encompassing collective bargaining’ (Doellgast 2012: 19). Similarly, Holman et al. 
(2009) explain differences in EI with reference to the strength of trade unions and of the vocational 
education systems (efficient VET creates the conditions for stronger EI). In Gallie's (2009) analysis — 
and in contrast to the arguments of Doellgast (2009) and Holman et al. (2009) — the strength of EI in 
Germany and the United Kingdom is similar and low compared to the Scandinavian countries. Gallie's 
conclusion, however, fits with other studies, in that he sees the trade union power as the decisive 
factor determining EI strength. Similar arguments have been developed in many other studies (e.g. 
Bélanger et al. 2003; Jürgens et al. 1993; Turner 1991).  
The cases of Germany, Brazil and China — the countries compared here — represent 
different models of industrial relations. We can illustrate this using the GerCar case. As is typical in the 
German automotive industry, GerCar's German plants are characterized by strong works councils and 
high union membership. The works council has wide‐ranging co‐determination rights granted under 
German law. Representatives of the metalworking union (IG Metall) hold a 95 per cent majority in 
GerCar's works council and negotiate collective agreements with the company. The relations between 
management and works councils are highly cooperative. Works councils support the company's goal 
of maintaining competitiveness and hence, they accept the company's position on lean production. But 
this acceptance is not unconditional. Team self‐organization on the shop floor is seen as a way of 
giving workers at least a minimum of discretion (see Turner 1991 on the German IG Metall debates 
about work organization and involvement in the 1980s).  
GerCar's Brazilian plants are also characterized by strong trade unions, with unionization 
levels of 80–95 per cent; this is typical for the Brazilian automotive industry in the Sao Paulo region. 
The trade unions of the plants studied here belong to the metalworking branch of the Central Única 
dos Trabalhadores (CUT). There are frequent consultations between employee representatives and 
management that cover not only the usual collective bargaining topics (wages, working time etc.), but 
also topics such as teamwork and the organization of improvement processes. The unions are 
characterized by their strong grass‐roots orientation, which makes them very sensitive to issues of 
work autonomy and self‐organization in teams.  
In China, the trade union is a subordinate organization of the Communist Party (Taylor et al. 
2003). Legislation assigns it an intermediary role between the management and the employees. The 
tasks of the union include organizing skill competitions, giving awards to model workers and managing 
social integration activities. The trade union chairman in GerCar's plants is also the Communist Party 
secretary for the company and takes part in executive board meetings. The trade union is consulted by 
the management regarding 
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all employee‐related issues (work safety, working times, wages etc.) and is also involved in important 
issues on the shop floor: in the selection of team leaders and shop floor supervisors as well as in 
continuous improvement processes. Due to its links with the Communist Party and its close 
involvement in shop floor management, the trade union is an influential actor in the company, but it is 
not a direct voice of the employees. Given the fact that many leaders of the union groups on the shop 
floor are supervisors, the trade union is also an important mechanism for controlling employees. We 
can expect that in this setting, workers’ self‐organization in teams is not a trade union priority.  
While we focus here on the role of company‐level industrial relations, it is clear that they are 
strongly influenced by the national regulation as well as by sectoral‐level organizations and collective 
bargaining. Building on the existing literature, we can develop the first hypothesis by putting the 
emphasis not on the strength but on the form of EI:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Labour bargaining power influences the form of employee involvement. 
Factories located in countries with stronger labour representation (Germany, Brazil) will be 
characterized by a stronger focus on self‐organization in teams than factories in countries with 
weaker or less independent labour representation (China). 
EI and Organizational Culture 
While industrial relations strongly influence employee involvement practices, it is not possible to 
explain the emergence of different forms of EI by industrial relations effects only. In particular, there is 
no clear relationship between industrial relations and the importance of direct management–employee 
communication and social involvement. In order to explain these EI dimensions we suggest including 
cultural effects in the analysis. 
‘Culture’ is often emphasized as an important determinant of EI (see Holman et al. 2009: 528 
and Edwards 2004: 403). Behaviouralist studies mainly refer to Hofstede's (1991) concept of national 
cultures. In a study comparing US empowerment concepts, the sociotechnical approach in Europe, 
and the quality circle concept in Japan, Erez (2010) argues that ‘work autonomy’ is regarded as 
positive in cultures that support an individualistic approach and a low power distance. Shapiro and 
Brett (2005: 169) argue that the absence of involvement in individualistic contexts with low power 
distances tends to be experienced as injustice, whereas it does not have a particular meaning in other 
cultural contexts.  
It is doubtful, however, whether practices at the organizational level can be explained by 
national culture. Hofstede himself argued that national cultures define the core societal values but 
cannot be a direct explanatory factor at the workplace level (Hofstede 1991: 182). In the long debate 
about the relationship between organizations and culture, many authors emphasized that due to the 
ubiquity of culture it is of little use ‘to explain a phenomenon as brought about by culture’ (Sorge and 
Warner 1986: 34).
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Instead of referring to national cultures, the following analysis assumes that we can identify 
sector‐specific organizational cultures in each country. To be more precise, the analysis focuses on 
the manufacturing sector and includes only those elements of organizational cultures which are related 
to EI practices. 
Let us briefly look at the three countries under study. Although German manufacturing 
companies were for a long time strongly characterised by paternalistic and authoritarian traditions, the 
co‐determination laws and the ‘humanization of work’ projects in the 1970s changed organizational 
cultures (Jürgens 1994; Jürgens et al. 1993). Inspired by Swedish forerunners, German automotive 
companies started to experiment with job enrichment and self‐organization in teams, even though 
none of the companies dared to abandon assembly line work. As lean production became to be 
regarded as best practice at the beginning of the 1990s, German automotive companies returned to 
short work cycles and standardized work. Despite this roll back, one element developed in the 
experimental phase of the 1970s and 1980s remained part of the organizational cultures: the 
emphasis on self‐organization in teams. The notion of self‐organization fitted well with the concept of 
‘Facharbeit’ (which is a combination of technical expertise, practical experience and independent 
problem‐solving capacity and only partially translatable as ‘skilled work’), which describes not only the 
model of vocational education but also an important dimension of organizational culture in German 
companies and an important reference for workers as well as for supervisors, engineers and 
managers (cf. Drexel 1997; Jürgens 1994).  
The Brazilian research literature emphasizes the traditions of authoritarian leadership styles, 
low trust in management–labour relations and the legacies of a ‘fire and hire’ approach, all of which 
leave little space for employee involvement (Humphrey 1982, 1993). These authoritarian and 
paternalistic legacies were accompanied by traditions of strongly segmented employment structures in 
Brazilian automotive companies. This segmentation meant high status differences between manual 
workers, skilled workers, white‐collar employees and managers, and hampered the implementation of 
team work and employee involvement (Humphrey 1993). The first changes to this kind of 
organizational culture only became evident in the late 1990s and were driven by experiments with high 
performance work practices due to the implementation of lean production approaches and by trade 
unions’ demands for stronger employee involvement (Rocha 2009).  
The few empirical studies about employee involvement practices in China emphasize two 
main legacies shaping organizational cultures: authoritarian leadership styles, but also traditions of 
mobilizing the workforce in improvement and problem‐solving activities. The latter go back to the first 
‘work group systems’ introduced in Chinese factories in the 1960s (Walder 1986). Work groups were 
elements of the shop floor organization, but also political units that organized the study of Marxist 
classics and Mao's works. Walder (1986) argues that the Maoist ideology put a strong emphasis on 
the moral education of the workforce and on socialist competitions between 
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factories, teams and individual workers. The Maoist mobilization campaigns ended in the 1970s, but 
social integration activities and competitions remained an important element of Chinese companies’ 
organizational cultures, as Warner (2008) and Cooke (2008) emphasize. These organizational 
legacies were drawn on when domestic and multinational companies started to introduce lean 
production systems and the related teamwork concepts (Chen et al. 1997; Yu 2012). Due to this 
development, work organization in car plants differs from the ‘disciplinary management’ (Hong 2008) 
in the textile and electronics industries (cf. Lee 1998). Production systems in automobile companies in 
China emphasize the mobilization of workers in improvement and problem‐solving activities — even if 
some studies remain sceptical about the level of employee involvement (Danford and Zhao 2012; 
Zhang 2015).  
Against this backdrop, we can formulate the following culture hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Organizational cultures influence the form of employee involvement. In 
Germany, we can expect EI practices that emphasize self‐organization in teams. In Brazil, we 
expect contradictory effects. While the authoritarian traditions should hamper the emergence 
of any forms of employee involvement, the change of organizational cultures due to the 
implementation of lean production concepts should provide some basis for employee 
involvement in at least problem‐solving and improvement processes. In China, we expect that 
employee involvement forms are strongly influenced by the tradition of intense social 
integration and mobilization activities in the companies. 
 
3. Methods and data 
The analysis is based on case studies of the German, Brazilian and Chinese plants of a German 
automobile manufacturer, which were conducted in the project ‘Personnel and Production Systems in 
the BRIC Countries’ (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2016). Table 1 shows the basic information about the 
plants. The automobile industry was selected because it is one of the industries referred to in the 
paradigmatic studies on lean production and employee involvement (cf. Pil and MacDuffie 1996). 
Germany is the home of key players in this industry, while Brazil and China are key growth markets. At 
the same time, these countries differ considerably in institutional and cultural respects.  
 
The case studies were based on qualitative, semi‐structured interviews (one to two hours 
each) conducted by Ulrich Jürgens and Martin Krzywdzinski
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between 2009 and 2011. In order to assure the reliability of information, we took care to 
involve the most important functions and roles in the companies: management and trade union 
representatives, the different hierarchy levels on the shop floor (workers, team leaders, supervisors, 
managers) and different functional areas within the management (HR and production management). 
For a systematic description of the project, its methods and the research field see Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski (2016: 19f). Table 2 presents an overview of the interviews. In all cases, the interviews 
were supplemented by plant tours.  
An important challenge in comparative research is translating categories and concepts across 
different languages, countries and corporate cultures. Ensuring that this translation is correct is crucial 
for construct validity. We solved this problem by involving a Chinese and a Brazilian partner in our 
research.
1
 Our partners prepared a review of the literature, helped us adapt the questionnaires to the 
Chinese and Brazilian context and took part in the interviews. As a final check of our interpretations, 
we presented the results to the companies, asking for comments and corrections.  
In order to grasp different forms of EI, it was partially necessary to develop new indicators. 
Despite considerable overlaps in the basic understanding of EI, existing empirical studies use different 
indicators depending on the data sets underlying the analysis. In their analysis of EI practices in the 
United Kingdom based on WERS98, Cox et al. (2006), for instance, include indicators for problem‐
solving groups and management–employee communication; WERS also offers indicators for self‐
organization in teams, but not for social involvement activities. Gallie (2013) uses the British Skills 
Survey, which offers indicators on team self‐organization, task discretion and consultative 
participation. Many cross‐country studies use the European Working Conditions Survey (e.g. Gallie 
2009), which offers indicators for self‐organization and autonomy in the teams and for management–
employee consultations; there are, however, no indicators for employee involvement in improvement 
processes (besides the very general question ‘Are you involved in improving the work organization or 
work processes of your department or organization?’) and for social involvement. Given these 
limitations, it is difficult to analyse differences in EI forms between countries and/or industries. 
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This study follows a unique approach by linking qualitative case studies with a quantitative 
measurement of core indicators. We hope that this will contribute to building multi‐dimensional 
concepts and measurements of EI. Table 3 illustrates the indicators used for the analysis and the 
values for the three cases presented in this article — see Section 4 for the detailed empirical analysis.  
The ‘self‐organization in teams’ dimension is measured by three indicators. The first one is the 
officially planned time for team meetings — an important precondition for coordination within teams. 
Like all other indicators, this item uses an ordinal scale from 1 to 4. The different values on the scale 
represent typical practices in the automotive industry. The second indicator is the topics that can be 
decided by the teams. The values on the scale once again represent typical practices in automotive 
manufacturing plants (potential topics include holiday planning, job rotation, training planning). The 
third indicator is the role of the team leader. The team leader can be an appointed supervisor or an 
elected coordinator and primus inter pares; intermediate forms are also possible, for instance, if the 
team leader is appointed by the management but he/she has no supervisory functions.  
The second dimension, ‘improvement activities’, is also based on three indicators. The first 
reflects resources for EI — in this case, problem‐solving training for team members. The two other 
indicators allow us to distinguish between two very different ways of involving workers in improvement 
activities. The first are team‐based activities (e.g. quality circles in Japanese companies). The second 
form is the participation of workers in expert‐based improvement activities. Typically, these are 
problem‐solving groups led by engineers or supervisors and involve experienced workers. 
The third dimension is ‘social involvement’ and it is widely neglected in existing research. The 
first indicator is social events in the company, which offer employees the opportunity to participate in 
organizational life and are aimed at creating the feeling of belonging to the organization; they range 
from formal events to convivial informal meetings between management and employees. The second 
indicator is competitions. Many such competitions do not aim to achieve narrow efficiency goals (e.g. 
productivity increases), but rather seek to mobilize employees in group activities and to strengthen 
commitment. They sometimes represent a ‘gamification’ element linking fun, learning and work. 
The fourth dimension is managerial information and communication activities, which can take 
different forms (information meetings, employee surveys, plant newspapers and web‐based 
information). We assign all practices the same weight, knowing that this represents a considerable 
simplification. 
The indicators used in the analysis to some extent reflect the particularities of the automotive 
industry: the dominance of assembly line work, for instance, limits the options for self‐organization. 
The design of the indicators might also be influenced by the fact that they are applied to just one 
company, a German manufacturer. At the same time, examining plants operated by a single 
manufacturer has certain advantages. It allows us to hold some factors
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(the production system and the nature of the work process, core features of HRM, corporate culture) 
that might otherwise influence EI practices relatively constant (cf. Batt and Appelbaum 1995).  
4. Empirical analysis 
GerCar's German Plant 
(a) Self‐organization in teams 
In the German GerCar plants, teamwork is regulated by agreements between the management and 
the works council. In the 1970s and 1980s, the company experimented with new concepts of 
teamwork (in part following Swedish examples) including a considerable expansion of job contents 
and the implementation of autonomous teams responsible for several work stations (see Turner 1991). 
The management's conclusion was, however, that this form of work organization was not compatible 
with mass production (Jürgens 
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1994: 203). In the 1990s, the company turned to lean production, and short work cycles on the 
assembly line once again became the standard model. But the teamwork experiments did leave one 
important legacy: the idea of self‐organization rights of the teams.  
In the 1990s, management and works councils concluded a number of plant‐level agreements 
about team work. One of the works council's main demands was that the team spokesperson would 
remain an elected position and that it not be transformed into a quasi‐supervisory function. In 2007, 
these plant‐level agreements were replaced by a general agreement for all German plants. 
This agreement emphasizes self‐organization in teams. Teams have complex tasks. Besides 
the direct line work, they are responsible for training and rotation planning, and they autonomously 
decide how often to rotate jobs. They are also required to take part in improvement activities, to control 
quality and to ensure the availability of material and equipment. To facilitate self‐organization, teams 
have 30 minutes per week for team meetings. The team spokesperson has a coordinating function 
within the team: her or she is elected by the team and is not a superior. In order to promote flexibility 
but also to give all the team members the opportunity to become team spokesperson, the teams are 
required to promote multi‐skilling. 
The agreement about teamwork is, however, limited to the German plants. For the plants 
abroad, GerCar does not have a defined standard regarding teamwork, although some German expat 
managers implicitly follow the patterns that are used in Germany. 
 
(b) Participation in improvement activities 
The improvement activities in GerCar's German plants follow the company's global standard and can 
be characterized as mainly expert‐based (cf. Jürgens 1994 on traditional approaches to continuous 
improvement in the German automotive industry; see also Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2016: 221f). The 
so‐called CIP cascade (continuous improvement process) is the main improvement process. The 
headquarters defines productivity goals for all plants, which are then used to define improvement 
goals for each shop and unit. Every year, the management organizes workshops for each team in the 
manufacturing area. These usually take one or two weeks and are directed by trained and certified 
moderators. The workshop participants include engineers, Meister and the team spokespersons from 
all shifts. The team spokespersons participate as representatives of their teams and their participation 
is regarded by the management as crucial for ensuring the legitimacy of the process. Rank‐and file 
workers do not usually take part, but they are consulted when the workshop participants try out the 
improvement ideas. Purely team‐based improvement activities (e.g. the quality circles at Toyota) do 
not exist in GerCar's German operations. 
 Problem‐solving teams constitute the second pillar of the improvement processes. The teams 
are usually appointed by the management to work on one main problem. They are composed of 
engineers, shop‐floor supervisors, team spokespersons and sometimes also experienced production 
workers. These 
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workers play an important role, but only a small number of well‐trained and experienced workers get 
the opportunity to be involved. 
The individual improvement suggestions are a further form of improvement activity. Rewards 
are given for improvement suggestions according to the savings they generate. The German main 
plant and other German locations receive on average 0.5 improvement suggestions per employee and 
year. 
 
(c) Communication and social involvement 
There are relatively few social involvement activities in the German plants. The company sometimes 
organizes cultural events, and some departments and areas informally organize activities, for 
instance, a bowling league for supervisors. In general, however, it is not common to link leisure time 
and company life. 
It is also very unusual to use competitions at the individual or team level. The works council is 
strongly opposed to such forms of involvement, because it fears that they might increase the work 
intensity and performance pressure on employees. 
To communicate with employees, the management and the works council present the main 
developments and plans of the company in quarterly assemblies attended by all employees. There 
have been few, if any, attempts by management to develop employee consultation channels 
independent of the works council and the trade union. The yearly employee survey is the main non‐
union channel of communication. It is conducted in all plants worldwide and uses a standardized 
procedure and questionnaire. Every unit — and in the manufacturing areas, every Meister — receives 
its results and supervisors are obliged to discuss them with their subordinates.  
 
(d) Summary 
To sum up, EI practices in GerCar's German plants focus on self‐organization in teams, while 
involvement in improvement activities is practised only in relatively limited forms. Social involvement 
plays only a very limited role. 
 
GerCar's Brazilian Plant 
(a) Self‐organization in teams  
In the 1990s, the Brazilian plants of GerCar underwent a modernization process linked to the 
introduction of a standardized production system in line with the German parent organization (Jürgens 
and Krzywdzinski 2016: 223). Like the German plants, the Brazilian plants governed this process via 
an agreement between the management and the trade union. This agreement was concluded in 2000 
and it defines the organizational structure of the shop floor, the roles of the supervisory levels as well 
as the tasks and rights of the teams.  
The teams have their own ‘rights of consultation and participation’ including the right to elect 
the team spokesperson, implement improvements in the team area, make decision about the contents 
of team meetings and job 
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rotation. Multi‐skilling is regarded as necessary to allow job rotation, which usually takes place several 
times per day. 
Similar to the situation in the German plants, the election of the team spokesperson is a 
central right of the team. The team spokesperson is not a supervisor, but the position is regarded as a 
stepping‐stone to the cell leader position (as the Meister are called in GerCar's Brazilian plants).  
Although weekly team meetings of 30 minutes are regarded as standard at GerCar, they were 
not practised in the Brazilian plants. Due to the lack of time, the teams had few opportunities to 
actually take on responsibility for job rotation, multi‐skilling and holiday planning. Most of these tasks 
were performed by the team spokesperson, who only consulted with the teams. A production manager 
commented:  
If you ask me whether the meetings take place regularly and with discipline, I can tell you it is 
not the case. […] We have a line and we would have to stop the line. In 100% of the cases, 
our priority is to have the volume, to be honest. (Interview BVP4) 
The lack of time for self‐organization reflects the management's limited interest in this issue. 
The management's priorities were to decentralize the shop‐floor organization and to strengthen the 
position of the cell leader. Self‐organization in the teams was accepted in order to gain the trade 
union's support for the change programme. The trade union, on the other hand, hoped to achieve a 
flatter hierarchy structure and to push back authoritarian leadership styles. 
 
(b) Participation in improvement activities 
The CIP cascade and the problem‐solving teams are the main types of improvement activities in the 
Brazilian plants and are implemented in accordance with the above‐described corporate standards. 
The implementation of improvement measures is one of the rights and duties of teams in GerCar's 
Brazilian plants. However, there is little evidence of these rights and duties in the ‘real life’ of the shop 
floor. The improvement activities are led by experts, engineers and supervisors, similar to the practice 
in the German parent organization. There is an individual suggestion scheme, which motivated on 
average 0.5 improvement suggestions per employee and year in 2009 and 2010. 
It is therefore not surprising that team members and team spokespersons do not receive 
systematic training in problem‐solving and improvement methods. The only training related to these 
topics takes place directly after recruitment. The company planned to introduce basic training for team 
spokespersons including training in improvement process methods. At the time of this study, however, 
this training had not yet been implemented. 
 
(c) Communication and social involvement 
The comprehensive social involvement activities at GerCar in Brazil differ from the German case and 
developed as a reaction to labour conflicts in the plants (cf. Humphrey 1982). The company is trying to 
promote a ‘cultural 
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change’ (Interview BVP9) and a cooperative attitude among the trade union and the management. 
The involvement of employees in direct communication with management and in social activities in the 
company is regarded as a way of building this new organizational culture (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 
2016: 282).  
The strategy for improving information and communication involves the so‐called Mega 
Dialogos. Once a month, the line stops and all shop managers talk to the employees about important 
developments and events. In addition, each cell leader has to hold a monthly meeting with his or her 
subordinates and discuss the situation in the unit. In order to get feedback from the employees, each 
shop has created a so‐called ‘information group’, composed of two or three employees. The 
information group meets with representatives from HR twice a month and talks about problems it has 
collected from employees. There are annual employee surveys that are conducted and communicated 
within the plant in a similar manner to the German plants.  
Competitions are an important dimension of employee involvement and are meant to promote 
social integration in the company. There is an annual company‐wide competition for all kinds of 
projects, which contribute to hitting the company's targets regarding quality, productivity, but also work 
safety or ergonomics. Each year, the company organizes a ceremony and awards prizes to several 
projects. The emphasis is on providing recognition for the participants and celebrating them. 
All shops organize competitions on a smaller scale. There are monthly rankings of all units in 
every shop regarding quality, productivity and employee attendance, which are displayed on huge 
boards with photos of the cell leaders. There are no monetary incentives linked to the rankings and no 
(or at least no public) sanctions for bad results. The aim is to give recognition for good results, as a 
production manager explains:  
 
Every month we get the results and the ranking. Every month we give a trophy to the winning 
cell. […] At the end of the year we award the overall winner cell. We have a big party to give 
the award and celebrate the winners: the best, the second best and the third best cell. 
(Interview BVP13) 
The competitions are accompanied by a large number of social integration events. They were 
introduced during the 2000s as a response to authoritarian leadership styles and conflicts between 
shop‐floor supervisors and workers. There are a huge number of activities, starting with small events 
for Women's Day, Mother's Day, Father's Day, Children's Day, Carnival, Festa de Junho and 
Christmas, which take place during the breaks. There are periodic factory tours for the families of the 
employees. While these events are coordinated centrally for the whole plant, there are many additional 
shop‐specific events, for instance, concerts by employee bands and sports and karaoke competitions.
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(d) Summary 
To sum up, self‐organization in teams is an important element of EI practices in GerCar's Brazilian 
plants even though it is implemented with less managerial support than in Germany. There is a similar 
level of involvement in improvement activities as in Germany. One important difference to the German 
plants is the extensive social involvement activities. 
GerCar's Chinese Plant 
(a) Self‐organization in teams 
GerCar's Chinese plants are joint ventures operated together with a Chinese partner, which opens the 
door for the influence of specific Chinese legacies. Until the second half of the 1990s, GerCar's 
Chinese plants developed their own production systems that had a strong focus on Japanese 
concepts and maintained the influence of traditional Chinese approaches. Although they started to 
implement the company's standardized production system at the end of the 1990s, the understanding 
of teamwork present here still differs from the German and the Brazilian cases (Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski 2016: 255f). From the point of view of the management in both Chinese plants under 
study, self‐organization within the teams is not a priority. German managers commented that, in their 
experience, the Communist Party — which is still present and influential in companies — regards self‐
organization with mistrust (Interviews CVH27 and CVP16).  
The teams do not have resources for self‐organization, for instance, in the form of time for 
longer team meetings. Job rotation, multi‐skilling and attendance planning are the responsibility of the 
team leader (Ban Zhang) in cooperation with the Gong Zhang, as the hierarchical equivalent of the 
German Meister is called in Chinese. Job rotation usually only occurs at intervals of several months 
and only for multi‐skilling reasons.  
The fact that teams lack self‐organization capabilities, however, does not mean that team 
members are not involved in team organization issues. In our interviews, the Gong Zhang argued that 
they encourage team leaders to delegate responsibilities to the teams. They emphasized, however, 
that they do not favour the delegation of responsibilities to the whole team but rather to the most 
engaged team members — the so‐called ‘core team members’ (Gu Gan) — in order to train and 
prepare them for higher functions. Team member participation in the Chinese operations is clearly 
selective in character.  
The core team members are at the top of a micro hierarchy in the teams (Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski 2016: 256). They work on the more demanding jobs and support the team leader in 
activities such as training new team members, organizing the team and problem‐solving. At China 2, 
the concept of the core team members is called the ‘five officers’ (Wu Da Yuan): the safety officer, the 
logistics officer, the quality officer, the equipment officer and the deputy team leader. A team leader 
describes the concept as follows:  
 
Take the example of the safety officer. He is in charge of leading the workers in shouting out 
the safety slogan at the morning meeting. Moreover, he is in 
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charge of the safety column on the team board. […] He takes care of the safety‐related 
documents, holds the safety‐related meetings and gives lectures about safety operation 
criteria for the other workers. (Interview CVS19) 
The core team members in the Chinese plant have more responsibility than is the case for 
normal team members in GerCar's German plants. This participation is, however, restricted to workers 
with the potential to become team leaders or experts. Participation is not a general right that extends 
to the whole team. 
A particular form of participation is evident in the selection process of the team leader. In 
contrast to the German plants, the team leader is the first hierarchical level in the Chinese plants. The 
selection is based on a process that includes a test of job‐related skills, an evaluation of leadership 
skills and technical knowledge, and an ‘opinion survey’ among the candidate's team. The team 
evaluates the candidate with respect to his or her work discipline, motivation to learn, thinking based 
on collective interests, organization and coordination capabilities, leadership skills and job‐related and 
technical knowledge. 
This practice of surveying team members is remarkable. It gives the team members the 
opportunity to influence the selection of the team leader. The ‘opinion survey’ forces the team to think 
about the competences required of the team leader from the company's point of view and several of 
the interviewed team leaders and workers reported that it increases the acceptance of team leaders. 
 
(b) Participation in improvement activities 
The improvement processes in the Chinese plants reflect GerCar's global standards. The CIP cascade 
and the problem‐solving workshops are the main improvement processes. In addition, there is also a 
system for individual improvement suggestions, which is strongly promoted. As is typical at GerCar, 
individual improvement suggestions are rewarded according to the savings they generate. The 
Chinese plants lead the company‐internal improvement suggestions rankings, with 11 suggestions per 
employee and year (2009) — far ahead of the German and Brazilian plants.  
The Chinese shop floor has some distinctive features. In particular at China 2, there is a long 
tradition of problem‐solving activities at the team level and the Meister‐unit level and this also involves 
the core team members. A Meister working in the assembly shop at China 2 explains:  
 
I usually decide the focus of improvement activities every quarter and assign the task to the 
relevant team. For example, I may decide that one of the themes is equipment kaizen. Then I 
assign the task to the team leader whose team's technical process is more related to 
equipment use than the others. In addition, there are also some cases when the team leaders 
bring their kaizen ideas to me. In this case the team leader and the core team members 
discuss it before it is presented to me. (Interview CVS26) 
The Chinese plants differ from the Brazilian plants regarding the training for production 
workers. In addition to the initial two‐week training for newly 
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recruited workers mentioned already in the Brazilian case, the micro‐roles that core team members 
are assigned give them the opportunity to acquire knowledge about quality, safety, logistics and 
equipment, which can also be used in improvement processes. The team leaders also receive a 
special two‐week training course, including a deeper introduction to the production system. 
(c) Communication and social involvement 
At the Chinese plants, we find comprehensive social integration activities, which bear some similarity 
to our findings for Brazil. A striking characteristic is the huge number of competitions that are held 
(Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2016: 260). All these activities are organized jointly by the management 
and the trade union. There are awards for the teams with the best results in CIP workshops and for the 
best problem‐solving teams. The problem‐solving teams also take part in competitions at the level of 
the Chinese parent company. The winners at this level are sent to the provincial‐level competition and 
to national‐level competitions. There are further team competitions for the implementation of the 
production system standards. In addition, on a monthly basis, each shop gives awards to the teams 
with the best results regarding quality and multi‐skilling.  
These team competitions are supplemented by the more than 100 skill competitions that are 
organized on an annual basis by the union. A production manager explains the incentive effects of the 
competitions as follows:  
 
The result and the certificates are displayed in the plant. […] Hundreds of workers see the 
result and this is a major motivation. The result also plays a role in promotion. (Interview 
CVP4) 
 
The competitions take place after regular working time. Besides the career incentives (workers 
need a positive participation record in order to become team leaders), there are also monetary 
incentives. 
Competitions are accompanied by a large number of sports and cultural events, celebrations 
and family activities (e.g. factory tours for the families). The trade union organizes health treatments 
for sick employees and holiday trips. 
We do not find any direct forms of communication comparable to the Mega Dialogos in the 
Brazilian plants. However, employee surveys are conducted every year. Each supervisor receives the 
results for his or her unit and has to discuss them with his or her subordinates. However, this standard 
poses particular problems in China where the ‘face’ culture (Earley 1997) and the importance of 
seniority make open criticism of superiors very difficult. In order to deal with this problem, the 
management of China 1 decided that discussions of the survey results would take place without the 
superiors — an interesting innovation in a social context marked by a high power distance. Employees 
discuss how to improve the situation in their unit and send the results of the discussion to HR, which 
then gets in touch with the respective superior. 
 Originally published in: 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 55 (2017), Iss. 2, p. 339 
 
 
(d) Summary 
GerCar‘s Chinese plants show much greater involvement of workers in improvement activities than in 
Germany and Brazil. This is accompanied by extensive social involvement activities; however, self‐
organization in teams is not regarded by the management as an important EI dimension. 
5. Discussion: the sources of variation 
Figure 1 compares the employee involvement forms. The results confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
GerCar's German plants are characterized by an approach to employee involvement that can be 
called the ‘self‐organization’ model, while social involvement activities are only weakly developed. The 
Brazilian plants exhibit considerable similarities to their German counterparts regarding self‐
organization in teams, even though this dimension is not as strong as in Germany. The Brazilian 
plants also differ from the German ones regarding the higher importance of social involvement 
activities. The Chinese plants, by contrast, take a considerably different approach, which we describe 
as ‘competition and social integration’. The concept of self‐organization in teams does not play a role. 
Surprisingly, however, we find considerably greater team involvement — or, more precisely, greater 
core‐team‐member involvement — in improvement processes. So far, the argument resembles earlier 
classifications of EI models developed by Appelbaum and Batt (1994) or Jürgens (1994). A particular 
feature, however, is that this form of involvement goes together with a strong culture of social 
integration and competitions. An important reason for the distinctiveness of the Chinese plants is 
surely the presence of a Chinese joint‐venture partner.  
Table 4 summarizes the determinants and the outcomes regarding the dominant EI logic  
The industrial relations systems explain the importance of team self‐organization as part of EI 
practices. Strong and independent employee representation with extensive bargaining power and 
rights seems to be an important precondition for self‐organization practices on the shop floor. This is 
the case in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in Brazil. In the Chinese case, the subordination of the 
trade union to the priorities defined by the Communist Party — to increase company productivity — 
lead the trade union to accept managerial concepts of EI that put the emphasis on involvement in 
improvement activities. This involvement is embedded in a dense web of social involvement activities, 
which are an important pillar of social control by superiors, trade union representatives and the 
Communist Party. For this reason and despite the union's considerable formal rights and resources, 
we characterize the Chinese case as one of weak representation of labour interests. 
Organizational cultures prove particularly relevant regarding social involvement activities. 
These practices are important in Brazil and in China, but less so in Germany. However, the 
relationship between organizational 
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culture and social involvement activities differs in Brazil and China. In Brazil, social involvement 
activities were developed to weaken authoritarian and paternalistic legacies, while in China they are 
part of paternalistic traditions. What makes them particularly resilient is their connection with political 
activities aimed at creating loyalty to the Communist Party. 
Organizational culture — in particular, authoritarian legacies — does exert some influence on 
self‐organization in teams, but this influence is less clear. The traditional Confucian authority norms in 
China support the development of micro hierarchies in teams, but they are not conducive to the idea of 
self‐organization. The Brazilian case shows, however, that it is also possible for company actors to 
attempt to break with cultural traditions. The top management and the trade union in the Brazilian 
plants shared the aim of changing the authoritarian traditions that they saw represented by the 
leadership style of the first‐line supervisors. 
This article does not aim at presenting an analysis of the outcomes of EI practices regarding 
job satisfaction or job quality. Our main reason for not doing so is that our research is based on a 
limited number of interviews with workers, which allows only very cautious interpretations. In addition, 
literature shows that satisfaction with EI practices is greatly influenced by individual characteristics 
(membership of a union, educational and skill level, personality etc.), which cannot be controlled here 
(Mohr and Zoghi 2008; Vidal 2007). The interviews do not provide clear evidence that certain EI 
practices (be they ‘self‐organization’ or ‘competition and social integration’) enjoy stronger acceptance 
among employees. Workers mentioned both positive and negative aspects of all the EI practices we 
studied. In the German and Brazilian plants, they viewed the opportunities for self‐organization in 
teams, and in particular, the possibility to elect (and to recall) the team spokesperson, positively. At the 
same time, they emphasized that assembly line work only offers limited space for self‐organization. 
Given these 
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limits, one should not overestimate the impact of the ‘self‐organization’ EI model on job satisfaction 
(see Gallie 2013 for a similarly mixed evaluation).  
The workers in the Chinese plants had mixed feelings about the ‘competition and social 
integration’ approach. Our interviews show that the involvement of core team members in evaluating 
team leader candidates and in the improvement activities considerably contributed to the acceptance 
and legitimacy of shop‐floor rules and processes (Krzywdzinski 2017). In this sense, EI worked as a 
way to align workers’ attitudes to the company's goals. The social involvement and the competitions — 
which are also meant to strengthen workers’ commitment to the company — were viewed positively by 
the workers and seen as an opportunity to get recognition for skills and knowledge. At the same time, 
workers complained about long working days and emphasized that competitions and problem‐solving 
activities make their working hours even longer. Given these pros and cons, we can expect the impact 
of the EI practices here to also be mixed. This fits with the findings of Wood et al. (2012) that the 
impact of employee involvement on workers is mediated by worker well‐being. In their study, EI only 
had a positive impact on motivation and performance if it was perceived as part of a mutual gains 
model.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper builds on comparative studies of EI practices that emphasize the role of labour bargaining 
rights and power (Doellgast 2012; Gallie 2009; Holman et al. 2009). It confirms this factor's 
importance, but adds also organizational cultures as an important determinant of EI in companies. In 
contrast to many studies focusing on the ‘OECD world’, this article compares factories in a developed 
industrialized country (Germany) with factories in two emerging economies (Brazil and China).  
This paper goes beyond the dominant approach in cross‐country comparative EI research, 
which involves measuring the strength of EI. The analysis here shows that even in the same company, 
we can distinguish between different forms of employee involvement rooted in different institutions of 
industrial relations and different organizational cultures.  
One consequence is that comparative analysis of EI has to be based on a complex set of 
indicators that allow us to capture different forms. This paper develops an initial suggestion for how to 
design a more comprehensive set of indicators.  
A second consequence is that one has to be cautious when comparing the strength of EI 
without taking into account differences in form. If we had simply added the indicators used in this 
article to compare EI practices in German, Brazilian and Chinese plants, we would have concluded 
that EI strength is relatively similar in all three cases. This interpretation hides, however, the different 
functional logics of EI practices in the case studies. The EI forms in Germany and Brazil represent 
compromises between managerial 
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and trade union concepts, while this is not the case in China. In the Chinese plant, EI is strongly 
dominated by management goals, which are, however, not limited to promoting higher efficiency, but 
are also aiming at providing opportunities to learn and recognition as well as strengthening the sense 
of belonging to the company. 
The analysis in this paper emphasizes the importance of social involvement activities and in 
particular competitions in the Brazilian and Chinese cases. Given the huge investment by 
management in these activities and the growing number of empirical studies related to this 
phenomenon (Alferoff and Knights 2003; Bolton and Houlihan 2009; Mollick and Rothbard 2014), it is 
surprising that they have been neglected so far in the EI research. They represent important 
managerial tools for shaping the behaviour of employees and strengthening their commitment and 
engagement. Their examination is an important field for future empirical research.  
The forms of employee involvement presented here are not exhaustive. They are influenced 
by the specific sectoral context of the automotive industry and by the selected country cases. In 
companies from different sectors (e.g. services) and in locations in different countries, we might find 
different approaches to employee involvement. Another limit of the analysis is that it focuses on formal 
practices and neglects informal EI forms (cf. Marchington and Suter 2013). 
We still lack a systematic comparative analysis of employee involvement. One possible 
hypothesis to be examined by future research is that there is a tension between self‐organization, on 
the one hand, and extensive social integration activities and competitions meant to create a strong 
corporate culture on the other. Due to this tension, the actual forms of employee involvement might 
cluster around two types: the self‐organization type and the competition/social integration type. 
Another open question is how different constellations of employee involvement practices influence 
motivation, commitment and work satisfaction. 
 
 
Note 
1. The interviews in Brazil were conducted with the support of Adriana Marotti de Mello (University of 
Sao Paulo) and in China with the support of Yu Nan (Jilin University).  
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